[1.1] The Earth is an esoteric limit to human material-conceptual structuring. Its analogues--the BwO, the Glacial, etc.--project varying material-conceptual descriptions of its consistent features, which to Deleuze and Guattari is represented as unformed, unstable matters and flows.
[1.11] This transcendent Earth, resistant to that which names it; too invariable to be encapsulated by particular phenomena which emanate from more particular thinking/beings, is obtusely dynamic but ultimately neutral and stable.
[1.12] As described, the elusive Earth, inexperienced but inferred "flees" from the hard structural apparatus of stratification; now not simply that which is below, suffocated by worlds (strata), it moves between--away--above (it must escape any and all strata). Forward-unending--absolute, unquestionably--the all-real. It knows nothing, but subsists.
[1.2] This pure ontological surface is populated by machinic assemblages, or is in some way the machinic assemblage itself--as unsubstantiated forms of actualized matter. On each side it faces two planes, the strata; toward the strata as interstratum and toward the Earth--BwO or plane of consistency--as metastratum. With two distinct objects identified as planes of consistency; the first machinic identification may be considered an intermediary between the two, the 'slowing' of the plane of consistency as "more compact." I assume that the thickened machinic assemblages are representative of the relatively stable, concrete features of the lived Earth, or of a being, or any complex matter prior to naming, designation or hierarchy. The use of 'facing,' though, seems to be a stretch considering; as it implies particular states or modes in opposition, as well as distinct spatial-relationships, which belay the concept.
[2.1] Deleuze and Guattari appropriate Hjelmslev's planes of content and expression to distinguish the basic, pure, and non-actual functions of their strata. In the context of their meta-system they interpret two of his terms, content and expression, as well as two general semiological categories, form and substance, as analogues.
[2.11] The Sausserian general categories, form and substance, are considered mutually contingent--"substance is simply formed matter," though the former is privileged above the latter within this contingency--"it is possible in certain instances to conceive of substanceless forms."
[2.2] Though contingent, they can each be recognized as doubled sides of each articulation, themselves doubly designated within Hjelmslev's personal terminology. Expression supposedly refers to functional structures, organizational forms and compound substances; while content refers to formed matters, "chosen" substances and formed orders. The double articulation of a strata is then the form and substance of content and then the form and substance of expression.
[2.3] Using these terms in such a way, suggesting what Hjelmslev really meant, exposes them to the entirety of his system and to the particular ways it stratified language, revealing an alternative and direct perspective on the terminologies function.
[2.4] Deleuze and Guattari, at least in their pure formulations, separate the articulations by content and expression; however, in Hjelmslev's literature the form strata are subsumed by a larger structure, schema, which may be considered synonymous in ways with language structure. As such, any reconfiguration of concepts, or extrapolation from them, should take into account the preformed structural designations.
[2.41] In this particular case, it strikes me as considerably more coherent to consider the articulations of strata, not based upon communications between between terminologies Hjelmslev himself considered arbitrary--which strangely enough Deleuze and Guattari note; but between the distinctions substance and form, which clearly articulate the inseparability and irreducibility of the two; while providing two inward facing, separate points centered by a spatial actuality which reduces difference in the manner suggested throughout ATP. It also seems, considering the aim of thinking difference, that the distinctive, separate, functional relationships between system--The Democratic Party, Microsoft, etc.--and structure--Democracy, Capitalism, etc.--as form and names--The Overcoat, Gogol, etc.--and abstract objects--a text, an author, etc.--as substance, though vaguely phenomenological in nature, offer clear comparative differences that manifest the temporal-ontological difference-in-kind on which their 'intensive' conceptions are contingent.
[3.1] Nonetheless, inverting the the articulatory double-movement to one of form-substance separation, while modifying the features of each articulation with Hjelmslev's expression-content is key; it is easy to imagine strata as vertical, inward facing, spatial, identifying-differentiators--each representing modes of the actual in form, themselves communicating with a contingent, substantive layer providing the rule set to a particular stratification.
[3.2] From a singular perspective, or a slice of space(time), a being simply is the interpellated material conditions of their substance-form, and in this sense it is clear to me what Deleuze and Guattari mean and the way in which they are correct about the mental-modal nature of form/substance distinction--they are a multitude of actual-spatial points, identified in different material conditions of the particular identification, at different degrees. There is in no such thing as the form of "capitalism" and as such one could consider my reorientation of their strata as misguided.
[3.3] However, from the stand point of difference-in-itself, the mutually and cyclically reciprocating rule sets which communicate directly with layers of actual conditions, also temporally reinforce the modal opposite through direct modifications of conditional features and contextual scope, essentially creating the illusion that the actual conditions of a form-substance stratification have indeed always been a way, making the real-virtual modifications of the contingent rule sets appear static, while they are in fact structurally illusory. This corresponds in someway with his concept of the living present.
[3.31] An aside according to the habit component of the lived present. Deleuze states, commenting on the habit base of the living present, that "when A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impressions of all contracted ABs. This is by no means a memory...or a reflection" (Difference & Repetition, 70). Christoph offers a clear example of this in his notes on DR, describing this habitual lived present as drawing "something new, something difference from repetition, namely, a general rule. I place my hand in the fire once and it hurts. I do it again, and it hurts again. From this [past] experience, I form a general rule [for future experience]: fire burns and hurts."
[3.312] What Deleuze describes as habit accords with declarative memory, whose loss is recounted in the film Memento. The account in the film, compared with numerous scientific accounts of the condition that I have read is quite accurate (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Amnesia#Anterograde_amnesia , for a quick gloss). Moreover, aligned with Deleuze's account of habit as non-memory, the film and certain cases of the related medical condition reinforce his concept. Despite Leonard's loss of his semantic--language, facial recognition, recognition of certain materials--and episodic--where, when, what, events, etc.--memory, he is still able to act habitually--"I will lose my memory, so I must write to myself."
[3.313] In the case of patient H.M., an anterograde amnesiac, she was unable to recognize her doctor during visits forcing her to reintroduce herself each time; the doctor hid a pin in his hand for a few consecutive meetings. Afterward, she would refuse to shake his hand, but still could not recognize him, nor could she report why she refused. She had no problem with other handshakes, but was paralyzed when confronted with this particular handshake.
[3.314] Why this is interesting is that it brings into question Deleuze's declarative rule hypothesis--as there is no prediction of the future, simply a basic recognition of an identified object. The memory system activated in this case is implicit memory, which shares space with unconscious emotional memory. I would suggest that in future considerations of time in Deleuze's work, it is at least considerable that there is memory insubordinate to difference, a type of pure moment; a phenomena that has been indicated by William James--i.e. physical stimuli mediate a reaction before a predictive future, as demonstrated by our running from a bear before we are able to process fear or danger; in other words, there is no repetition of "bears are dangerous" required for the response.
[3.4] Materials are stratified by features and systems, which communicate with the map of the machinic assemblage, its milieu and materials as segments of expression-content, which oscillate as if in space, held by the surrounding abstract machines; playing with thier pieces, I can almost envision the shifting, virtual complex; though I am not sure what to do with it.
I will continue later, when I have finished articulating my thoughts. My intent is to comment on parastrata/epistrata, on intensities, and to further explain my rule layer description.
Short responses to both of the previous posts
[1] The issue with the Socratic question, "what is...?" is painfully overstated. When ontologically questioning existence, there is an obvious deterministic and transcendent prescription that colors any answer; however, the actual form "what is...?" when directed at a word's use and how it is meant and how that meaning relates to other used meanings does not follow such aforementioned determinism. It requires no definition and in actuality embodies a clear form of difference. What better embodies difference-in-itself than the clear shift in a words meaning when modified by condition and context? This essentially means that the word-object is purely relational and immanent and that its meaning is derived from the material participants in its use (force like).
[2] Whether or not molecular and molar are differential levels in physics is largely irrelevant in the case of Deleuze and Guattari's use; they clearly separate the function of the terms as concepts. The first is described to represent conditions of both/and while the second is described to represent conditions of either/or. A virtual dualism is still a dualism, if they wish to expel them, they would be served well by avoiding roundabouts and shortcuts.
[3] We should also look at the ways in which we use the word monster and how it functions in language: "my ex-girlfriend is a monster," "Michael Jordan is a monster," "Hitler was a monster," "I have become a monster," or "it's a monster!" Monstrosity has no inherent physical connotations nor does a fixed essence. In each of the previous examples one could describe different conditions of monstrosity--my ex screams at me when I misplace the house keys, Michael Jordan dominates his field, Hitler lead a genocide, I have lost control over my actions, a person sees a disfigured person, etc.--none of which hold primacy over the other. Furthermore, we could imagine situations where the word is only slightly modified and a statement's meaning changes, such as "that building is a monstrosity" and "that building is monstrous." Must becoming monster leave behind a human artifice? Must it be physical? Must it be a movement at all? Can it be a state?
[4] Darwin's use of human is different from Sartre's use of human; if we choose Darwin's use for the basis of a new humanism (human speciesism is probably more tenable to my conception) then can we reorient an identification? If knowledge changes the rules of the game, the word may be used in different ways; the word itself had no meaning aside from human use and human propagation, its representative qualities rely on the (con)textual material surrounding.
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